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 *Cov. L.J. 63  Introduction 
In R v Sang1 the House of Lords held that entrapment is not a substantive defence in 
English criminal law. In addition they concluded that to allow the trial judge to use his 
common law discretion to exclude evidence simply because it had been obtained by the use 
of an agent provocateur would be to allow the defence of entrapment through the 
‘evidentiary backdoor’. Although Sang has not been overruled, entrapment per se not 
being a defence, the law in this area has developed significantly as a consequence of both 
statute and developments at common law. Section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence 
Act 1984 (PACE)2 provides the trial judge with a very wide discretion to exclude evidence, 
whilst at common law there has been increased recognition of the scope of the abuse of 
process doctrine, enabling the court to stay proceedings as a consequence of police 
activity. The question is, what factors are likely to result in the exclusion of evidence under 
s.78 PACE or the staying of proceedings as an abuse of process? In addition, is the 
approach taken by the English criminal courts compatible with the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights? 
The House of Lords addressed both these key questions in the appeal of Loosely against his 
conviction on three counts of supplying, or being concerned in supplying to another, a Class 
A drug, and a reference brought by the Attorney-General, the two cases being heard 
together. 
The Facts 
 
 The appeal of Loosely  
The case against Loosely and his co-accused, Harris, was that they had supplied heroin to 
an undercover police officer known as ‘Rob’. In 1999, the police in Guildford mounted an 
undercover operation due to concern about the trade of Class A drugs in the area. One 
focus of the operation was a public house called the Wooden Bridge. It was at this public 
house that a man gave the appellant's telephone number to *Cov. L.J. 64  the undercover 
police officer, Rob, as a potential source of supply. Rob telephoned Loosely and asked him 
whether he could “sort us out a couple of bags”. Loosely said that he could and supplied 
directions to his flat. Rob went to Loosely's flat, where they agreed a price of £30 for half a 
gram of heroin. Rob then drove Loosely to a flat belonging to Harris. Loosely took the £30 
from Rob, returning a few moments later with the heroin in a package in his mouth. They 
returned to Loosely's flat to conclude the deal, Loosely taking a small quantity from the 
package before giving the rest to Rob. Subsequent analysis indicated that the substance 
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was indeed heroin. Four days later, Rob telephoned Loosely. Again a deal was done and 
Rob was supplied with half a gram of heroin. Three days later Rob went to Loosely's flat and 
asked if he could supply him with a gram of heroin. Following a telephone call, Loosely took 
Rob to another address where he took £60 from Rob, returning with a package. Rob was 
told that this was half what he requested and that the rest would be ready in an hour. 
Although Rob returned several times to Loosely's flat, no further drugs were supplied. 
At trial, it was submitted as a preliminary issue that either the indictment should be stayed 
as an abuse of process or, alternatively, the evidence of Rob should be excluded at the 
judge's discretion under s.78 PACE. Following a voir dire , the judge, referring to both 
English authorities and the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in Teixeira de 
Castro v Portugal3 , declined either to stay proceedings as an abuse of process or to 
exercise his discretion under s.78. After considering the relevant authorities, he concluded 
that the guiding principle was that “… the commission of offences should come about 
without the prompting of undercover officers in the sense that they provoke or incite the 
commission of offences which would otherwise not have occurred without their 
intervention…”. In this case, he felt that the undercover police officer had done no more 
than present himself as an ideal customer and that, considering all the circumstances, his 
actions did not amount to incitement. Following the judges' ruling, Loosely changed his 
plea to guilty on three counts of supplying heroin and appealed against conviction. 
The Court of Appeal,4 in dismissing the appeal, considered that the law in this area was 
clear and consistent with both the European Convention and the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights. Evidence of a law enforcement officer should be excluded by a trial 
judge under s.78 if that officer had incited or trapped the defendant into committing the 
offence. However, where such an officer had merely given the defendant the opportunity to 
break the law and he had freely taken advantage of that opportunity in circumstances 
where it appears he would have behaved in the same way if the opportunity had been 
offered by anyone else, then there was no reason why the evidence should be excluded. 
The Court of Appeal certified the following as a point of law of general importance: 
“Should the judge have refused to admit the evidence of the undercover police officer ‘Rob’ 
because the role played by ‘Rob’ went beyond mere observation and involved asking the 
appellant to supply him with heroin, a request to which, on the judge's findings, the 
appellant readily agreed?” 
 *Cov. L.J. 65  The Attorney-General's Reference  
The case against the defendant was that on two occasions he had supplied a Class A drug 
(heroin) to undercover officers. The defendant had a proven history of dealing in Class B 
drugs. Undercover officers approached the defendant and asked him whether he wanted to 
buy contraband cigarettes. He did and a deal took place. The officers then asked him if he 
could supply them with heroin. The defendant said he did not know and that they should 
telephone later. This the officers did and the defendant said he could not supply at short 
notice and that they should telephone in a week. A week later the officers telephoned to say 
that they would be bringing more cigarettes. The defendant agreed to take them to the 
heroin supplier and said that in future they could deal directly with this supplier. At 
interview the defendant said that he had “nothing at all” to do with heroin but had become 
involved because the two men had approached him. The officers “were getting me cheap 
fags, so as far as I was concerned a favour for a favour”. 
At trial, the defence applied for the evidence of the undercover officers to be excluded 
under s.78 PACE or for the prosecution to be stayed as an abuse of process. The trial judge 
accepted the defence submission that the defendant had been incited to commit the 
offences, stating “…it is absolutely clear to me that in this case these officers went further 
than was permissible and in fact incited and procured the defendant to commit an offence 
he would otherwise not have committed”. The trial judge concluded that, on the basis of 
Teixeira de Castro v Portugal,5 the defendant had been deprived of a fair trial and the 
proceedings were stayed as an abuse of process. The prosecution then offered no evidence 
and the defendant was acquitted. 
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Following the acquittal the Attorney-General referred the following point of law to the Court 
of Appeal: 
“In a case involving the commission of offences by an accused at the instigation of 
undercover officers, to what extent, if any, have: i) the judicial discretion conferred by 
section 78 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984; and ii) the power to stay the proceedings 
as an abuse of the court; been modified by article 6 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights?” 
The Court of Appeal6 held that, in considering an application to stay proceedings or to 
exclude evidence under s.78 PACE, the court would be concerned both with the freedom of 
action of the accused and with the propriety or otherwise of the actions of the undercover 
officers. In most cases the principal question will be whether the officers did no more 
(whether by active or passive means) than to afford the accused the opportunity to offend, 
of which he freely took advantage in circumstances where it appears that he would have 
behaved the same way if offered the opportunity by someone else or whether by means of 
unworthy or shameful conduct they persuaded him to commit an offence of a kind which 
otherwise he would not have committed. The Court of Appeal considered this approach to 
be consistent with article 6. The Court also accepted that it would not always be easy to 
determine whether an individual had freely accepted an opportunity and would have acted 
similarly had it *Cov. L.J. 66  been presented by someone else and that it was not wise to 
lay down in advance any rule for deciding when the court should intervene. Teixeira de 
Castro must be considered on its own facts in the context of the Portuguese criminal justice 
system and the trial judge was wrong to conclude that he had no choice but to rule as he 
did. The Court felt that if, on the basis that the prosecution version of events had been 
found to be correct, the trial judge had asked himself whether the undercover officers had 
done more than give the accused an opportunity to break the law of which he had freely 
taken advantage, he would have answered that question in the negative. The Court of 
Appeal referred the point of law to the House of Lords. 
The decision of the House of Lords 
In respect of Loosely , the House answered the certified question in the negative, 
dismissing Loosely's appeal. The undercover operation had been authorized and overseen 
by a senior police officer. The trial judge found that the undercover officer had presented 
himself to the appellant as an ideal customer. The judge also found that he did not go 
beyond that portrayal and that he presented himself exactly as someone in the drugs world 
would expect to see a heroin addict. The judge concluded that the officer's conduct did not 
constitute incitement and on the facts before him he was entitled to come to that 
conclusion. 
In respect of the Attorney-General's Reference , the House disagreed with the view of the 
Court of Appeal and considered that the trial judge had been correct to stay the 
proceedings as an abuse of process. The House considered that it was clear that the 
defendant had supplied heroin to the undercover officers because they had offered to 
supply, and did supply, him with cheap cigarettes. The officers did more than give him the 
opportunity to commit the offence, they instigated the offence through inducements that 
would not normally be associated with such an offence. The House answered the point of 
law referred by the Attorney-General in the negative. There was no significant difference 
between the requirements of article 6 and English law as it had developed through s.78 
PACE and the power to stay proceedings as an abuse of process. 
Commentary 
In dismissing Loosely's appeal and answering the point of law referred by the Attorney 
General, the House of Lords has reviewed the law in relation to entrapment; the 
relationship between s.78 PACE and the power to stay proceedings; and the compatibility 
of domestic law in this area with article 6 and the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights. 
The House of Lords confirmed that Sang is still good law, in that it is still true to state that 
entrapment is not a substantive defence in English criminal law and that neither s.78 nor 
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article 6 have ‘created’ a defence of entrapment. However, as Lord Nicholls states, “It is 
simply not acceptable that the state through its agents should lure its citizens into 
committing acts forbidden by the law and then to seek to prosecute them for doing so.” But 
the difficulty lies in identifying conduct which is defined by imprecise words such as ‘lure’, 
and in defining the boundary between acceptable and unacceptable police conduct. To 
some extent to date, the guidance given by the courts both in respect of s.78 and staying 
the proceedings as an abuse of process has *Cov. L.J. 67  involved indicating relevant 
factors that should be taken into account by the trial judge when considering whether to 
exclude the evidence or stay the proceedings. Although this approach provides flexibility, a 
degree of greater certainty would be injected into the law in this area if greater guidance 
were given and an indication of the weight to be attributed to particular factors. Although 
the House of Lords in this case thoroughly reviewed the current law in this area, the 
guidance remains limited. 
 The current law  
Section 78 provides the trial judge with a very wide discretion to exclude evidence and the 
wording of s.78 specifically requires the judge to have regard to all the circumstances, 
including those in which the evidence was obtained. Although initially the Court of Appeal 
in R v Harwood7 expressed the view obiter that s.78 could not be interpreted so as to 
abrogate the rule that entrapment is not a defence, subsequent case law indicated that 
s.78 should be interpreted widely. In R v Smurthwaite and Gill8 the Court of Appeal held 
that entrapment or use of an agent provocateur did not provide a defence but this did not 
mean that s.78 was irrelevant. What mattered was the effect of the manner in which the 
evidence was obtained on the fairness of the proceedings. The Court of Appeal provided an 
inexhaustive list of factors to be taken into account when considering undercover 
operations. These factors tended to focus on a causation test, the first factor being whether 
the defendant was enticed into committing an offence he would otherwise not have 
committed. In addition the judge was to consider factors such as how active/passive was 
the role played by the officer and was there an unassailable record of what occurred. 
Although a step forward, this list of factors was not accompanied by detailed explanation or 
guidance on the weight to be attributed to particular factors. 
Alongside the development of the law in relation to s.78, the common law was developing 
with an increasing acceptance of the role of the abuse of process doctrine in respect of 
entrapment. In R v Horseferry Road Magistrates' Court, ex p Bennett9 , the House of Lords 
established that proceedings may be stayed not only where a fair trial is impossible, but 
also where it would be contrary to the public interest in the integrity of the criminal justice 
system that a trial take place. The House of Lords confirmed in R v Latif and Shahzad10 
that this principle applies to entrapment cases but felt that, due to the infinite variety of 
cases that could arise, general guidance as to how the discretion should be exercised in 
particular circumstances would not be useful. The trial judge would need to balance the 
public interest in ensuring that those charged with serious offences should be tried and the 
competing public interest in not conveying the impression that the end justifies the means. 
A development in the law in relation to entrapment, but again factors to be weighed in the 
balance without clear guidance. 
 Moving forward?  
The House in Loosely was clearly of the view that staying proceedings is normally the 
appropriate response to a case of entrapment rather than the exclusion of evidence *Cov. 
L.J. 68  under s.78 (although the effect may be the same). Although not a new approach, 
this clarification by the House is welcome. A prosecution founded on entrapment would be 
an abuse of the court's process and hence proceedings should be stayed. The entrapped 
defendant is normally concerned not that certain evidence should be inadmissible but that 
due to the entrapment he should not be tried at all. This does not mean that s.78 does not 
have a role to play and indeed if the application to stay proceedings is unsuccessful then an 
application can be made to exclude evidence under s.78. Section 78 will be of particular 
relevance where, for example, the credibility or reliability of the evidence offered by the 
undercover officer is in doubt rather than the manner in which the evidence was obtained. 
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The House considered in some detail the conduct of undercover officers and when such 
conduct might cross the line into unacceptable behaviour. A key test identified by the 
House of Lords was whether the police simply presented the defendant with an 
unexceptional opportunity to commit a crime, such as might have been offered by others. 
However, even then, other factors such as how intrusive the methods were must be taken 
into account. The House of Lords was clear that the police must act in good faith and 
wholesale ‘virtue testing’ without good reason is not acceptable conduct. Reasonable 
suspicion of an individual or a particular place may indicate good faith. In Williams v DPP,11 
the police were aware of a problem with theft from vehicles in a particular area and 
accordingly set up a vehicle with the back door open and cartons of cigarettes visible. The 
Divisional Court held that the justices were right not to exclude the evidence on grounds of 
unfairness. The appellants had acted voluntarily. The House of Lords in Loosely were of the 
opinion that action by the police is permissible to target a specific problem. However, they 
recognised that had such activity been carried out by an individual policeman without 
evidence of a problem in the area then that would amount to an abuse of state power. 
The House in Loosely also gave their approval to ‘test purchases’ and recognized that some 
undercover operations will inevitably involve active rather than purely passive behaviour 
by the police and that such activity may be necessary to effectively detect certain types of 
crime. In DPP v Marshall,12 on a charge of selling alcohol without a licence, evidence was 
given of purchases made by undercover officers. The Divisional Court held that there was 
no deception practised by the undercover officers, merely a failure to reveal their identity. 
In Nottingham City Council v Amin13 , a taxi driver, who was not licensed to ply for hire in 
a particular district, accepted two undercover police officers as fare paying customers. A 
stipendiary magistrate ruled that the evidence of the officers should be excluded under 
s.78 PACE. The Divisional Court, allowing the appeal, was of the view that the defendant 
had not been ‘prevailed upon or overborne or persuaded or pressured or instigated or 
incited to commit the offence’. The House of Lords approved both these decisions, Lord 
Nicholls stating in both cases that the undercover officers had behaved as any member of 
the public might have done. This test is presented as a ‘useful guide’ to identifying the 
limits of acceptable behaviour and indeed formed the basis of the rejection of Loosely's 
appeal. 
The House in Loosely also considered that the nature and extent of the police participation 
in a crime would be a factor in indicating when the police had *Cov. L.J. 69  overstepped 
the mark. They felt that the greater the inducement held out, and the more forceful and 
persistent the police action, the more readily a court might conclude that the police had 
acted in an unacceptable manner. In addition, the court should have regard to the 
defendant's circumstances, including his vulnerability. In respect of the Attorney-General's 
Reference , and in disagreeing with the view of the Court of Appeal, the House indicated 
that in their view the defendant had been offered an inducement by the police (contraband 
cigarettes) such as would not normally be associated with the offence of supplying drugs. 
The trial judge had been correct to stay the proceedings. The House felt that the 
predisposition of the defendant was of very limited value in determining whether evidence 
should be excluded. It could be a relevant factor but such predisposition did not mean that 
the defendant could not be entrapped. 
It must be concluded that the House in Loosely has comprehensively reviewed the current 
law. It has indicated that normally, where there is an allegation of entrapment, the correct 
procedure is for the defence to seek a stay of proceedings on the grounds of abuse of 
process and, to this limited extent, the roles of s.78 and the abuse of process doctrine, are 
clarified. However, the law in this area has not effectively moved forward. The lists of 
factors to be considered are reviewed and to some extent clarified but there is little 
additional guidance. It is still very much a case of the trial judge exercising his discretion on 
a case by case basis. The difficulty with this is highlighted by the Attorney-General's 
Reference; the House of Lords, with the exception of Lord Scott, disagreeing with the view 
of the Court of Appeal that the trial judge was wrong to stay the proceedings, thus 
indicating the need for further guidance in order to inject a greater degree of certainty. 
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The European Convention on Human Rights 
In Teixeira de Castro v Portugall,14 the defendant, who had no previous criminal record 
and was unknown to the police, was introduced to two undercover officers by a third party. 
The undercover officers said they wished to purchase 20g heroin. The defendant purchased 
drugs on their behalf and sold them to the undercover officers at a profit. The European 
Court of Human Rights held that there had been a violation of article 6 (1). The use of 
undercover officers had to be restricted and safeguards put in place even in cases 
concerning the fight against drugs. The right to a fair trial under article 6 could not be 
sacrificed for the sake of expediency and the public interest could not justify the use of 
evidence obtained as a result of police incitement. There was no evidence that Teixeira was 
predisposed to crime and this offence was incited and would not have been committed 
without the police intervention. The defendant was denied a fair trial from the start. The 
Court attached significant weight to the fact that Teixeira was not suspected to be involved 
in drug trafficking, was not known to the authorities and there was no evidence that he was 
predisposed towards crime. He was incited to commit the offence. 
In answering the point of law referred by the Attorney General, the House of Lords 
concluded that that there was no significant difference between the requirements of article 
6 and English law as it has developed through s.78 and the power to stay proceedings. 
Although the Court of Appeal in Smurthwaite15 focused more on a test of *Cov. L.J. 
70  causation rather than predisposition, one factor to be considered was whether the 
officer was acting as an agent provocateur in enticing the defendant to commit an offence 
he would otherwise not have committed. In following these guidelines, it would be hoped 
that a trial judge would have excluded evidence akin to that offered in Teixeira , indicating 
consistency with the approach taken by the European Court of Human Rights. However, 
can the same be said for circumstances similar to those arising in Williams16 and Amin17 
? The individuals in these two cases acted voluntarily and were under no pressure, but 
equally were not being specifically targeted by the police and were not individuals of known 
criminal disposition. To what extent therefore were they incited to commit offences that 
they otherwise would not have committed? In Williams the police were responding to thefts 
in the area but the trap set tempted individuals to commit opportunistic crime and, 
arguably, this oversteps the boundary. In Amin , on appeal, the defence submitted that the 
police had not acted in a purely passive manner and had instigated the offence as a 
consequence of which the defendant had been deprived of a fair trial. This argument was 
rejected, with Lord Bingham concluding that Teixeira needed to be considered on its facts 
and in Amin the defendant was not deprived of a fair trial, the police merely offering the 
defendant the opportunity to commit the offence. The House of Lords in the present case 
agreed with Lord Bingham, Lord Nicholls expressing the view that if a person freely takes 
the opportunity to break the law given to him by a police officer, the police officer is not to 
be regarded as inciting or instigating the crime. 
There is undoubtedly a grey area where it will be difficult for the trial judge, having paid due 
regard to the guidance provided by the House, to determine whether or not the evidence 
should be excluded. One area of particular difficulty is where a defendant who was 
previously unsuspected by the police, has acted willingly. In Teixeira the defendant acted 
willingly and yet was deemed to have been deprived of a fair trial from the outset. Amin 
clearly comes close to the borderline and it can be argued that traps such as that set up in 
Williams cross the border into unacceptable police behaviour. Further guidance is surely 
required to ensure both consistency in domestic law compatibility with article 6. 
 Principal Lecturer in Law, Coventry University. 
Cov. L.J. 2001, 6(2), 63-70 
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